Much of immigration law is made not by Congress or by regulation but by decisions in individual cases. When the Board of Immigration Appeals or the Attorney General designates a decision as precedent, every immigration judge and DHS officer must follow it, and a single decision can change the outcome for tens of thousands of people.
Quick Facts
- Binding effect: 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)
- Attorney General review: 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)
- Where published: Administrative Decisions Under Immigration and Nationality Laws (“I&N Dec.”)
- In court: no deference on the meaning of the statute since Loper Bright (2024)
The Board and its precedents
The Board of Immigration Appeals is the appellate body within the Justice Department’s Executive Office for Immigration Review. It hears appeals from immigration judges and some DHS decisions. Most of its decisions bind only the parties, but decisions it designates as precedent bind DHS officers and immigration judges in all proceedings involving the same issue (8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)). Precedents are cited by case name and volume, for example Matter of Q. Li, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025).
The Attorney General’s role
The Attorney General may direct the Board to refer a case, or take one on request of the Board or DHS, and decide it personally (8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)). Those decisions bind the Board and immigration judges, and they have repeatedly been used to reshape areas such as asylum and immigration-court case management. Because they come from a political appointee, they tend to change with administrations.
Precedent in the courts
Board and Attorney General decisions reach the federal courts of appeals through petitions for review. Since Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), courts decide the meaning of the immigration statute for themselves instead of deferring to the agency’s reading. A precedent can therefore bind every immigration judge and still be rejected by a court of appeals. The two can coexist for some time, with outcomes that differ by circuit.
A 2025 example: detention and bond
In 2025 the Board held that people apprehended shortly after entry are applicants for admission subject to mandatory detention (Matter of Q. Li, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025)). It later held that immigration judges lack authority to hold bond hearings for people present without admission (Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)). Immigration judges had to follow those decisions at once. Federal courts then divided on the underlying statute, and the question is now before the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari. There is a closer reading of how two 2025 Board decisions reshaped bond hearings, including the habeas litigation that followed. The circuit split is summarized in Habeas Corpus and Immigration Detention.
Sources
- 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1
- EOIR, Agency Decisions (BIA and Attorney General precedents)
- Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024)
- Matter of Q. Li, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025); Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)